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INTRODUCTION
The centrality of technology to strategy is illustrated by the range of contributions that focus on technology-based firms. 1 For instance, it is fundamental to Prahalad and
Hamel's 2 'core competency' work, as when they state that the 'real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporate-wide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities' 3 . An implicit assumption here is that technology is not only a significant input into strategy, but that it is the significant input.
However, this significance mutates into confusion when the concepts are grounded in empirical world, where we find the same term used to describe what are quite clearly different situations. For instance, exploiting existing competencies in a new situation may be understood as a 'new technology', but so too is developing new competencies in an existing state of affairs. 4 Prahalad and Hamel depicted the former in their description of how NEC, Casio and JVC took the skills and technologies in which they were expert, and applied them to different markets -the essence of the resource-based view -while an example of the latter is the replacement of diffusion technology by the ion implantation process within the semiconductor industry 5 . Or consider Ryanair's introduction of the internet to facilitate direct seat booking by passengers and Tesco's strategy of installing petrol stations in their parking lots. These might be considered as examples of the strategic leveraging of new technology, but this 'bolting-on' of an unrelated technology is conceptually problematic since it is easily copied, is not central to the firm's work, and does not improve the firm's core competencies in any meaningful way. In that sense, it is hardly a 'new technology'.
3
Another set of circumstances relates to the case of a new technology created and introduced by firms that do not compete in any standard way but 'change the competitive rules of the game' 6 . Together, these examples highlight the nuances in the relationship between technology and strategy, which necessarily vary given the range of different circumstances in which it is examined.
The range of possibilities associated with technology-based competition needs to be clarified so that the circumstances associated with each may be investigated. In this paper, we develop a model to help classify the possibilities. We then focus on one new technology situation to demonstrate the framework's application and usefulness. In brief, then, the research question driving the study is: 'What constitutes a new technology and what strategies are characteristic of firms that create and introduce them?'
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The terms 'strategy' and 'new technology' are what we might call 'fat' terms, in that they are pregnant with multiple and varied meanings. And when the terms are conjoined -as in 'new technology strategies -the meaningful possibilities multiply, to the point of confusion. There is need for clarity, while still retaining a focus on the essence of both concepts.
We begin by considering the concept of strategy. An important discussion within the strategy literature is whether strategic action is the outcome of formal planning processes or whether it emerges in response to ad hoc opportunities and are only subsequently interpreted as part of a 'strategic' plan. This is the 'planning' versus 'emergent' debate. These two dichotomies -emergent versus planned strategy and latent versus sensible technology -may be used to establish a framework within which the nature and nuances of the relationship between new technology and strategy can be addressed.
This can help discriminate between the different situations described in the introduction, for example, where an understood technology is deliberately re-applied to a new area, or where existing technological strengths have become the basis for new products. We propose to illustrate this range of potential relationships using a simple but powerful model, which was developed by taking the relevant dichotomies in strategy and technology and using these as orthogonal sets of poles. When graphed against each other, these orthogonal poles create four quadrants that represent four separate sets of circumstances in which the relationship between technology and strategy is enacted.
These axes are graphed against each other in Figure 1 . In this diagram, the condition of the technology is represented on the horizontal axis as between 'latent' to the left, and 'sensible' to the right. Strategy is represented on the vertical axis as being between 'emergent', at the bottom and 'planned' at the top. The four potential situations resulting from the intersection between technology and strategy are: development;
capitalisation; cultivation; and creation. It is important to clarify that while this model is a useful means of conceptualising the differences between the circumstances in which firms find themselves, it is not proposed as a means of categorising all new technology firms in the marketplace. We also emphasise that each quadrant depicts an ideal type.
Even though we will find elements of each type in any given situated practice, there is still much of conceptual value in distinguishing between these ideal types. In particular, the circumstances that the quadrants describe are distinctive enough to allow us to map and make sense of the empirical world in an interesting and relevant way.
In the remainder of this section, we will briefly discuss and describe the development, cultivation and capitalization quadrants. In the next section we consider the creation quadrant in more detail. Devices with the development of micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) 25 . These firms fit into the development quadrant in the sense that they recognised gaps in the marketplace and then developed portable pacemakers and MEMS accelerometers to fill those gaps through a deliberate planning process.
The 'cultivation' quadrant describes how the further cultivation of a technology may take a firm in a direction that had not been originally planned. In this case the strategic action emerges out of, most typically, an opportunistic response to a situation, or an action is taken, perhaps for idiosyncratic reasons, that is only in retrospect understood as 'strategic'. Examples of the types of situations/stories from this quadrant include Sharp's experience with LCDs, and Intel's with microprocessors 26 . In both cases these firms had a good understanding of a particular technology -in Intel's case, despite the plans of senior managers -and successfully moved them into different markets.
The 'capitalisation' quadrant describes how firms may bolt-on existing well-understood technologies to an existing business. This has already been adequately described using Ryanair's internet booking and Tesco's petrol retailing initiatives. Petrol retailing and internet booking are well-understood -i.e. sensible -technologies and the initiatives to bolt these on to existing businesses resulted from planned initiatives by the companies.
STUDYING THE CREATION QUADRANT: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our framework presents a potentially useful and novel way to consider the interrelationship between technology and strategy. Considerable empirical research, going beyond the illustrative examples of the previous section, would be required to assess fully the taxonomy's value. In particular, it is only through grounding in the empirical world that we can adequately identify the appropriate unit of analysis that would populate the taxonomy -is it the firm, the industry, the technology, or (our preference) a techno-economic narrative that blends all three? As a first step, we now present a case history of one such narrative that is centred on the 'creation' quadrant.
An important benefit of the framework is methodological, in that its distinction between quite different understandings of new technology and strategy provides a good way to orientate a research inquiry. More pointedly, it asks us to consider in which quadrant the study is located? Of course the answer to this question may itself require some prior empirical work, but prima facie there seems to be a clear distinction between, for instance, the techno-economic activities of Ryanair and Tesco in the capitalisation quadrant and the type of narrative that we will now explore in the creation quadrant.
Since the 'creation' quadrant provides perhaps the most intriguing case of strategic action in a new technology situation, we chose to study this quadrant in more detail.
Following Mintzberg's assertion that 'strategy is a pattern in a stream of actions' and
Latour's exhortation that we should inquire into how things come to be, we decided that an industry case history was the appropriate research method to employ. 27 
Following
Ragin's 32 suggestion that cases are defined by 'boundaries around places and time periods', we mark a boundary around an industry over a given time period, using historical as well as contemporary data. But the case is not merely a chronological listing of historical events. It is a narrative used because it both represents a particular entity within a theoretical construction, and it may reveal something new to us about a very complex reality 33 .
In order to investigate the circumstances that NT firms experience we chose to investigate the stent industry, which we are positing as a paradigmatic case of the creation quadrant. 34 This industry has been in existence since the 1980s, so it is old enough to have impacted upon existing industries and established its place in the market, but young enough to remain relevant to practicing academics and managers in the new technology field.
Our case history is primarily based on secondary data which was obtained from a broad A challenge associated with the data collection was that, although we chose to investigate a clearly defined technology and its associated market, industry, and firms, 11 the volume and range of data along time and across these elements was very substantial.
To deal with this issue we decided to supplement the secondary data with a limited amount of primary data. Specifically, we interviewed two senior employees in four of the five primary competitors in the industry using a variation of the repertory grid technique. 35 These interviewees included both technical (e.g. R&D manager or design engineer) and non-technical (e.g. IT manager, sales manager) staff. An important objective in this part of the research was to develop constructs that were, as far as possible, grounded in the situated experience of those in the industry. It was this requirement that attracted us to the repertory grid technique because it seeks to identify the personal constructs that actors use to make sense of the world. The technique also substantially reduced the tendency of the interviewer to influence the direction of the interview -useful in most interviews but critical in these interviews which were performed at a time of competitive turmoil within the industry when the majority of interviewees could be characterised as reluctant. A triadic methodology was used whereby the interviewee was presented with three words (on cards) and asked to select a pair which fit together, and to separate the third from this pair. The two issues which this pairing and separation process generated -one for why each pair fit together, a second for why each third was different -became 'poles' on scales about which the interviewee was concerned. This was done with a series of sets of cards which were chosen randomly from a set written by the interviewer prior to the interviews. The types of poles generated by this process included terms such as: balloon-based/not balloon-based; market/product; after arrival in market/prior to arrival in market; external to company/internal to company; primary objectives/how to achieve; patent/stent; business area/means of acquiring patent; regulatory body/product. These outcomes generated scales which largely confirmed the issues which the ongoing research had led the authors to consider as important. For example, product specificity was importantwhat type of technology is being discussed? Location of activity was important -is it within the firm or the industry, or is it external to both? Access to intellectual property was critical -is it useful, can we make it ours, can we access it somehow/anyhow?
These were among the important issues examined during this research.
The repertory grid technique provided a useful way of abbreviating the data, while staying grounded in the practitioners' view of their situated practice. Although the interviews were relatively few in number their impact on the process of making sense of the data was significant as they kept us focused on the issues that were seen as important by the actors within the industry, and also the interviewees' responses confirmed the importance of issues arising from the secondary data.
A CASE HISTORY OF THE STENT INDUSTRY
Stents are small structures that are inserted into arteries to clear blockages. They can be visualised as something similar to a ballpoint pen spring. Stents are delivered to blockages by catheters and are frequently expanded into position by balloons 36 .
In 1929 the German doctor Werner Forssmann self-catheterised his heart, the first time this had been achieved. Further progress was made in this area over subsequent decades until, in 1964, 'transluminal angioplasty' was introduced by Dr. Charles T. Dotter. This operation, in which successive catheters of increasing diameter were inserted to clear a blocked artery, was the fore-runner of modern angioplasty, which uses a balloon on a catheter to expand a stent within the human body. In 1977, Dr. Andreas Gruentzig performed the first catheter lab coronary angioplasty on a conscious patient in Zurich.
These advocates -Forssmann, Dotter and Gruentzig -of the technology championed it in the face of sometimes hostile reactions, and educated potential customers as to its usefulness.
But the arterial blockage frequently re-appeared following the angioplasty procedure.
Stents were designed to prevent this re-blockage, and the first coronary stent, the Despite this, the firms in the stent industry have to get their products to market without delay. This means that they have to force the inevitable and prove that their products are effective as quickly as possible. By this we mean that they have to 'force' acceptance of their technologies, although in retrospect, it may appear that the technology was so appropriate that its adoption was 'inevitable'. While this is a reasonably structured process now, with clinical trials and approval processes familiar to the firms, it was less so previously. For example, Forssmann's self-catheterisation and Dotter's initial angioplasty were very dramatic ways of proving the effectiveness of the technology. This forcing the inevitable might be considered a small part of the story of stent technology, but the divided reactions received by the technological pioneers involved grant it greater significance. For example, Forssmann was fired from his job for his self-catheterisation, but recommended to a larger hospital, where he could continue his work. He was fired from that job within two years for a variety of related issues, by which time he had 'cut-down' his own arteries more than two dozen times.
Consigned to the life of a country doctor he subsequently shared the 1956 Nobel Prize for medicine for his work. Similarly, Dotter's introduction of angioplasty was received with suspicion in the US, with the take-up being much more enthusiastic in Europe.
When Gruentzig presented his experimental findings of coronary angioplasty in 1976, he also met with a mixed reception. These issues, associated with the need to prove the Cook as it struggled to enter the drug-eluting stent market. Initially it signed an agreement with Cook, which was subsequently described as a 'sham' by the courts.
Guidant then began the process of acquiring Cook, but the courts ruled that the firm could not benefit from any drug-eluting technology developed during its earlier illegal agreement. Guidant jettisoned the smaller firm claiming its drug-eluting stent was no more effective than its own, and Cook retired from the market. Guidant later suffered similar treatment at the hands of J&J, when the latter firm agreed an acquisition price and then attempted to reduce it. Guidant was eventually acquired by Boston Scientific.
The forcing the inevitable issue described as part of subversive incrementalism has a counterpart in the industry's internal activities. In this case, bringing the technology (which has been proven effective) to market as quickly as possible is the issue. It is illustrated by describing how Guidant brought the Ancure Endograft system -a means of treating abdominal aortic aneurysms incorporating the use of stents -to market and persisted with it, despite it being associated with several deaths and dozens of emergencies. The firm eventually withdrew the product from the market and incurred legal penalties. J&J/Cordis's Cypher drug-eluting stent was rumoured to be associated with blood-clotting in patients, and although this was subsequently attributed to placement techniques and the rigour of subsequent anti-rejection drug regimes, it remains an example of how unprepared the medical industry and patients were for its proper use, despite it being an effective technology. This is an important issue as it illustrates well the challenges faced by new technology firms. Even if the new technology is effective -in isolation -the market and infrastructure often needs to be adjusted to properly utilise it. In the absence of, or prior to, such adjustment, the use of the new technology can be quite dangerous. These examples illustrate how quickly firms are willing to go to market with new products despite even the most serious implications for customers, if poor judgement is used.
These legal leverage, opportunistic flexibility and forcing the inevitable activities all illustrate the aggressive and bitter internecine competition at the heart of the stent industry.
DISCUSSION
This research addresses the relationship between strategy and new technology. Initially it attempts to clarify these terms, which are simultaneously fundamental but ambiguous, through the development of a two-by-two framework. A case history of the stent industry is then used to examine the most interesting of the four domains defined by this model -that which relates an emergent strategy with a latent technology.
The findings of this work can be summarised in four points. The first is that new technologies are created and introduced over significant periods of time. In this respect they lack the 'revolutionary' characteristic normally attributed to them when they are viewed through the 'destructive' or 'disruptive' technological frames of reference.
The second is that legal activities are endemic within new technology industries and it is common for very large financial judgements to be awarded and appealed repeatedly, and for lawsuits and counter-suits to be continuously engaged in. The courthouse rather than the marketplace is a major competitive arena for new technology firms.
The third point is that relationships between new technology competitors tend to be mutually antagonistic, with alliances being created and demolished without regard for consequences, and with the strong acquiring the weak, and their technologies. As a result of this, combined with the legal leverage utilised to gain competitive advantage, the speed and scale of market share changes in new technology industries is very substantial.
Finally, and as a consequence of the above points, it becomes clear that new technology firms are much more aggressive when interacting with direct competitors -internal to the industry -than when dealing with existing industries and infrastructures -external to the industry. This suggests that there are two mechanisms at work in the stent industry and this has several implications for both further study and future new technology company strategies.
The first -subversive incrementalism -characterises how the new technology industry manages external relationships (i.e. by avoiding confrontation, accepting that it will not replace the existing technology/industry, and attempting to reveal itself as part of the competitive landscape as distinct from trying to replace that landscape). This mechanism is illustrated by the fact that the coronary stent industry has not destroyed its existing competitor, the cardiac surgery expertise. Stent technology is not in a position, more than two decades after its introduction, to eliminate the previously established heart by-pass surgery technology. In this sense, this research provides only limited support for the concept of 'disruptive technology' as it suggests there is a period during the time when a new technology is being created and introduced that the objective of the introducing industry is not the destruction of the existing industry, but rather its cooption. The stent industry finds itself in a situation where it needs the existing markets to accept its technologies, and the regulatory and legal structures to accommodate its activities. It also needs customers to change from the previous technology to its own offering, and other agencies to change their processes to suit the new technology products. This supports Christensen and Raynor's concept of 'competing with nonconsumption' 37 . They suggested that new technology industries should not confront the incumbent industry in order to survive, but rather should address a niche in the market that is not being served by the incumbent, by which means the new technology industry can build some strengths without being perceived by the incumbent as a threat. The stent industry's subversively incremental activities align with this concept quite neatly.
The second mechanism -internecine competition, describes how the stent industry manages its internal competitive activities. The industry is ruthlessly internally competitive, with firms relentlessly using legal leverage to restrict the activities of These challenges faced by new technology firms and industries may be significantly different to the challenges faced by actors in the development, cultivation and capitalisation circumstances. Being aware of these challenges and differences can move us closer to understanding how to succeed in these various situations.
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